BENTHAM AND THE ETHICS OF TODAY. By David Baumgardt. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952. by Forer, Edward L.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
10-1-1953
BENTHAM AND THE ETHICS OF TODAY.
By David Baumgardt. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1952.
Edward L. Forer
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward L. Forer, BENTHAM AND THE ETHICS OF TODAY. By David Baumgardt. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1952., 8 U. Miami L. Rev. 145 (1953)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol8/iss1/20
BOOK REVIEWS
BNcrmAm AND THE ETHICS OF TODAY. By David Baumgardt. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952. Pp. xiv, 584. $9.00.
To such a non-philosophical mind as that of this reviewer, it seemed
dubious at the outset that a book such as this-a review of the hedonistic
philosophy called "utilitarianism" of which Jeremy Bentham, if not the
founder, was the most vocal exponent-would provide more than a spate of
mental gymnastics. Yet after overcoming the inevitable, initial mental
inertia and with the assistance of good dictionary (Cf. p. 106, inconcinnities;
p. 233, algedonic calculus; p. 534, eclectic eudaemonism; etc.), it proved to
be a profund challenge, not only to the reader, but to what we consider to
be the basic tenets of our society.
The book is described by its author as "a systematic transverse section
through Bentham's moral philosophy." He uses the genetic method of
exposition and criticism of such of Bentham's ethical works as the Fragment
on Government, Comment on the Commentaries (Blackstone's), Introduc-
tion to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Trait6s de Legislation Civile
et Penal4, his later juristic writings (including certain manuscripts previously
unpublished), and his Deontlogy "to show their connections with pre-
Benthamite thought and to comment in detail on their importance for
contemporary systematic ethics." The treatment of each of the above-
mentioned writings demonstrates that each approaches practically the same
problems, but from different viewpoints and angles as Bentham advanced
from youth through maturity.
It must be admitted that despite his self-confessed bias toward hedonism,
the author freely discusses the criticisms leveled against Benthamism and
finds a few of them valid though by no means incapacitating to Bentham's
hypothesis of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. He admits
such fundamental flaws in Bentham's works as his lack of understanding
of the genuine importance of religious life and of the arts. On the other
hand he denies the opposed and inconsistent charges of over-simplification
and over-complication and further denounces the critics of the hedonic
calculus for their "false ambition of precision." As to the latter criticism,
it is claimed that one of the great merits of hedonism is thatb it forces the
moralist to go into the most conscientious and impartial weighing of
complicated emotional details. He points out that the fact that meteor-
ologists often fail in their predictions is no reason for total rejection of the
science of meteorology, which still remains superior to any method yet
found for predicting weather. In like manner, he says, "the felicific estimate,"
which provides a better method than any yet found for distinguishing
moral from immoral acts, should not be discredited for its failure to make
an exact assessment of degrees of feeling. It is submitted that the hypothesis
of utilitarianism lends itself less to the criticism of inconsistency than does
the Natural Law which Bentham criticized so harshly, or the Common Law,
which he termed a "mechanical veneration for antiquity."' But in its
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attempted application of objective measurements to what perforce must be
subjective judgments of preconceived pleasure feelings connected with
specific activities, it must fall far short of its aim. Nowhere is it made
clear nor does it seem possible that there could be found any omniscient
body of judges, legislators, or philosophers, or any others for that matter,
who could make value judgments of pleasure and pain applicable to all
strata and sectors of their own or other societies. Oil the other hand, if
we regard Bentham's writings as having contributed a new exactness to
ethical thinking by precise definition of what were previously vague
generalities, it seems apparent that the criticism in no way negates the value
of his work.
Previous mention was made of the challenge presented to our societal
foundations. More specifically, in our own l)cclaration of Independence
certain truths are held to be self-evident, among which are life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness. But to Bentham there is only one truth-the
pursuit of happiness-and all other such propositions must be relentlessly
and coldly weighed on his scales of pain and pleasure. In his philosophy
there can be no such quality as we are plcascd to call unselfishness; it must
perforce be termed enlightened self-interest, no matter how remote the
"pleasure" to be gained may be from the act in question; i.e., the mother
who sacrifices her own life or limb to save her child from an onrushing
automobile must be getting more pleasure from the thought that the child
will live than the amount of pain she is about to suffer. By Bentham's
standards, the right to rebel against bad or tyrannical laws is based only
on the utilitarian criterion of "the prospect of success." And, of course,
since the happiness of the greatest number is the ultimate end, any means
which do not produce pain in such amounts as to outweigh the happiness
to be produced are absolutely justified. If this is in truth a nation of laws
rather than of men, could it ever survive the adoption of a philosophy ill
which any end, no matter how worthy, could justify the adoption of dis-
honorable means to reach it?
This is not a book for reading in an evening, a week, or a month. It is
a largely indigestible, but nevertheless stimulating presentation of tile ideas,
right or wrong, of a courageous and original intellect. The author, despite
his justifiable, intellectual vanity, makes a substantial contribution to a
clearer understanding of the Great Reformer.
E DWARD L. FORER M\EMBER OF FLORIDA AND DADE COUNTY BARS
INTERNATIONAL LAw, CASES AND IMATERIALS. By William NV. Bishop, Jr.
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953. Pp. 735. $9.75.
For more than a quarter of a century "Hudson's Cases," now in its
third edition (1951), was used as the casebook in law school courses on
international law. Dickinson's Casebook (1950) and Briggs' valuable "The
